strengths and weaknesses of liberal internationalism

1 (January 2009), pp. Liberal internationalists have stressed a variety of agents of and strategies for reform. Liberal internationalism also stipulates that violence should only be resorted to only after diplomacy and all other options have failed. Some internationalists (including Mill) supported the idea that enlightenment could be exported to backward countries. 140161. Andrew J. Nathan, The Puzzle of the Chinese Middle Class, Journal of Democracy, Vol. Finally, some scholars maintain that alliances provide narrow economic benefits to the United States.90 U.S. military alliances may help preserve the dollar's role as the world's leading currency, enhance the U.S. ability to negotiate favorable trade deals, and improve trade flows that benefit the U.S. economy.91 Others disagree, at least regarding the magnitude of these effects.92 In any event, these arguments bear on whether U.S. security alliances increase U.S. prosperity, not on whether they help preserve the open economic system. 2 (April 2016), pp. The modern nation-state was born and has developed within an international system that can be described as liberal internationalism. Charles L. Glaser, Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, International Security, Vol. 14, 2. In a world where illiberal intrusions into one's internal politics have become a clear and present danger, sovereignty will have to be reinforced as a core value of international society; re-invigorating notions of shared citizenship in distinct political communities, and integrating these communities into a broader, universalist narrative will 273281. If the United States retains its security commitments in East Asia and Chinese economic growth continues, then, for the foreseeable future, the world will not be the liberal hegemony described by the LIO literature. With aligned interests, nations can pool their resources and work together. In general, liberal internationalists regard violence as the policy of last resort, advocate diplomacy and multilateralism as the most-appropriate strategies for states to pursue, and tend to champion supranational political structures (such as the European Union) and international organizations (especially the United Nations ). On preserving the liberal order, but also the limits that should be placed on democracy promotion, see Michael W. Doyle, A Liberal View: Preserving and Expanding the Liberal Pacific Order, in T.V. on international security affairs. 19, No. 4 (Spring 1986), pp. Systematic examination shows that this framing creates far more confusion than insight. Liberalists believe that there will be conflict when actors cannot agree on an interest, however, they keep an optimistic outlook on the possibility of cooperation. In this article, I show that the LIO concept suffers from theoretical weaknesses that render it unable to explain much about the interaction of the United States with its adversaries or its allies. Thus, the economic interdependence and convergence arguments do apply. Economic relationshipsspecifically, economic interdependenceand regime typespecifically, democracymay also be defining features of security orders, as well as of international orders more broadly.7. In addition, a range of additional theories must be employed to adequately analyze U.S. international policy, including those that address deterrence, power transitions, alliance formation, the security dilemma, and other causes of war. This has often been cast in terms of the weakening or decline of state sovereignty. Jones et al., The State of the International Order, p. 4. Consequently, although U.S. policy requires analysis of the interactions among its economic, security, and diplomatic policies, the LIO lens is not useful for this purpose. Cold War grand strategy of containment called for protecting Western Europe from the Soviet Union; NATO was created for this purpose and is a key component of the LIO. 27, No. These U.S. misperceptions increase the probability that the United States will misinterpret adversaries policies by failing to understand them as reactions to threatening U.S. policies. Let's review what we've learned. It also involves a dual process of decentring of the state: a delegation downwards by central governments to the infra-state level, and a transfer upwards to the international or supra-state level. For others, it requires the construction of international institutions. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds., Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). See, for example, Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. As I believe, liberalism offers the possibility of peace even as states amass power, on the basis that power has now taken a less destructive form, from guns to bank notes and exports. NATO's influence is well understood, however, in terms of established theoriesincluding theories that explain why alliances form, how they support deterrence, and when they threaten adversaries. Overall, liberal internationalism has both strengths and weaknesses as a foreign policy approach. To repeat the obvious about the partial nature of the LIO, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were not included in the order, but rather were directly opposed by it. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. International Relations Overview & Theories | What is International Relations? Some U.S. officials, including George Kennan, favored this approach. Liberal internationalism is a set of related concepts on how to best organize international relations between states and non-state actors that emphasizes a belief in international progress, interdependence, cooperation, diplomacy, multilateralism, and support for international political structures and organizations. More important, the LIO terminology clouds analysis of international policy by obscuring what is actually occurring. Whether China's economic inclusion is a net positive for the United States remains an open question, but it certainly strengthens the economic pillar of the LIO. 587613, doi.org/10.1111/J.1468-2478.2010.00601.x. The postCold War era is less clear cut. The institutional binding argument suffers serious weaknesses. In addition to lacking analytic value, framing discussions of U.S. international policy in terms of the LIO tends to build in a status quo bias: the vast majority of such discussions start from the premise that preserving the LIO deserves top priority. On wealth as a barrier to reversion, see Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and Fact, World Politics, Vol. Second, there is little evidence of hierarchyunderstood in terms of a dominant power with legitimate authorityin U.S. alliances. 161166. The LIO concept suffers from two main problems. As mentioned, balance of threat theory underscores that power is not the only factor that should influence states decisions about balancing.75 The belief among EU states that U.S. motives are essentially benign, at least as they pertain to the use of military force to compel or defeat members of the EU, largely explains this lack of external balancing.76, Proponents of the liberal hegemonic order claim that it played an important role in maintaining great power peace during and after the Cold War. What are their strength and weaknesses? By partial, I mean that the order does not include all of the major powers;41 by inward looking, I mean that the LIO concept primarily addresses interactions between states that are members of the order, not interactions between its members and states that lay outside the LIO. Lake discusses, among other things, authority within families and religious groups. The Essay Writing ExpertsUK Essay Experts. International commerce aided by liberal. 579614, doi.org/10.1017/S002081830002703X. F. A. Hayek argues that Liberals try not to repress or discriminate their populace, every individual should be protected against all attempts to enforce them by violence or aimed discrimination. 25, at p. 5. 1 (2018), pp. In general, liberal internationalists regard violence as the policy of last resort, advocate diplomacy and multilateralism as the most-appropriate strategies for states to pursue, and tend to champion supranational political structures (such as the European Union) and international organizations (especially the United Nations). 7791. In contrast, international order can imply broad acceptance, even though China and Russia reject some of the LIO's key elements. A weaker state that requires the alliance for its security may have little choice but to accept highly asymmetric terms. This is likely the case in Europe today, although it was not during the early Cold War when NATO was created. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), pp. The initial step in any analysis of grand strategy is to identify a state's fundamental interests; typically, security and prosperity rank highest. In effect, this perspective implicitly assumes that what is good for the United States is good for others as well. The LIO conceptthe logics that proponents identify as underpinning the LIOis focused inward, leaving it ill equipped to address interactions between members of the LIO and states that lie outside the LIO. Liberal internationalism is a theory in international relations about how relations among international actors should be conducted and how the international system should be structured. Art, A Defensible Defense, p. 35. 1 (October 1997), pp. 561598, doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027831. 7793. 1 (Spring 2016), pp. Another strand of the LIO concept holds that hierarchy built on legitimate authority, granted by subordinate (i.e., weaker) states to the dominant (i.e., stronger) state, is essential to explaining cooperation under anarchy. For more than a decade, it has become increasingly clear that China is building conventional and nuclear forces designed to reduce U.S. military capabilities. A strong case for Liberalism is that it can be viewed as peaceful due to the history of liberalism, never have two liberal democracies gone to war which shows the level of cooperation between them and that the balance of power within the world has been upset by authoritarian regimes and outdated ideas and polices, the strand in liberal thinking which holds that the natural order has been corrupted by undemocratic state leaders and outdate polices, (Baylis and Smith, 2001, pg 178). Hurd focuses on why states follow international norms. 1 (January/February 2017), pp. Finally, the Soviet Union was largely excluded from the West's open markets and its financial system; thus, economic interdependence arguments do not apply. 130 lessons 1 (Summer 1989), pp. Sharpe, 2003), p. 13. Ikenberry, of course, understands this, acknowledging that the liberal order existed within a bipolar system. Another distinction is between global and regional orders, see David A. 1. In contrast, the LIO lens starts with a single option and the assumption that it is desirable. 5279, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00124; and Richard W. Maass, Carla Norrlof, and Daniel W. Drezner, Correspondence: The Profitability of Primacy, International Security, Vol. International liberalism believes in the power of cooperation and interdependence. 6166. How should U.S. policy adapt, if at all? Describe the tenets of liberal internationalism, Explain the benefits and criticisms of this theory. Liberals argue the need for collective security as to prevent the world falling into international anarchism and up hold human rights, democracy and a free market where people are free to trade. 43, 41; and Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, pp. See also Meghan McConaughey, Paul Musgrave, and Daniel H. Nexon, Beyond Anarchy: Logics of Political Organization, Hierarchy, and International Structure, International Theory, Vol. Balance of threat theory also posits that the larger an external threat, the larger the risk that allies will accept from within the alliance. Available research indicates, however, that the size of these interactions is hard to estimateexperts disagree on their magnitude, with some finding that the benefits are insignificant. 1 (Summer 2010), pp. Once an order is established, a member state may be unable to quickly change it. William C. Wohlforth, Realism, in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. Its like a teacher waved a magic wand and did the work for me. For realists, and many positivist lawyers, international law is either a misnomer, because there is no sovereign to enforce it, or it is irrelevant, because powerful states can ignore it. These risks depend on the military vulnerabilities created by participating in the alliance and on the state's beliefs about its allies motives and intentions. Discussing the strengths and weaknesses of each of these paradigms will help in determining which of these approaches is the most persuasive. Regime Theory Overview & Approach | What is Regime Theory? Worse yet, framing U.S. policy in terms of the LIO is potentially dangerous; by exaggerating the threat posed by small changes to the political status quo and implicitly rejecting adaptation to the new balance of power in East Asia, the LIO lens could encourage the United States to adopt overly competitive policies. During bargaining over the creation of an alliance, or adjustments to an existing alliance, the dominant power can threaten, at least implicitly, not to reach an agreement. Although proponents of selective/deep engagement accept that there is some uncertainty about whether U.S. forward-deployed security commitments are necessary to preserve the open international economic system, they conclude that the value of economic openness warrants buying insurance via these security commitments. 1624. Ibid., pp. 775808, doi.org/10.1162/002081800551361. Gholz and Press argue otherwise. 5264. In this section, I briefly describe five mechanismscausal logicsthat LIO theorists argue produce the order's outcomes:19 democracy, hierarchy built on legitimate authority, institutional binding, economic interdependence, and political convergence.20. In addition, the United States may find itself overextended with outdated commitments. Should the United States instead adopt competitive policies that are inconsistent with the LIO but that may be required to preserve U.S. regional dominance? 3 (Summer 2016), pp. Our readers have come to expect excellence from our products, and they can count on us to maintain a commitment to producing rigorous and innovative information products in whatever forms the future of publishing may bring. Nations working together would also promote world peace and diversity amongst themselves. They have further sharpened See, among others, Charles L. Glaser, Why Unipolarity Doesn't Matter (Much), Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 549, doi.org/10.2307/2539078, which makes many important points, but overstates the pessimistic case; Keohane, After Hegemony; Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste A. Wallander, eds., Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Celeste A. Wallander, Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). Ikenberry also holds that throughout the Cold War, this American-led liberal international order was the dominant reality in world politics. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1. From time to time certain models dominated the theoretical and practical agenda. 5262, which highlights the central role of the Soviet threat; Stewart Patrick, The Best Laid Plans: The Origins of American Multilateralism and the Dawn of the Cold War (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), especially pp. 2259. Content may require purchase if you do not have access. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, p. 56. 3 (May/June 2014), pp. Charles A. Cooper and Benjamin Zycher, Perceptions of NATO Burden-Sharing (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, June 1989), p. v. See also U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S.-NATO Burden Sharing: Allies Contributions to the Common Defense during the 1980s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, October 1990). Bodies such as the European Union presented a model for future supranational political structures. By grand strategy, I mean the broad policiesmilitary, diplomatic, and economicthat a state pursues to achieve its vital interests.98 The LIO is simultaneously a product of U.S. grand strategy and a part of U.S. grand strategy. Moreover, even if the weaker state believes that the agreement contains significant risks, its other optionsincluding no alliancemay be worse. We've received widespread press coverage since 2003, Your UKEssays purchase is secure and we're rated 4.4/5 on reviews.io. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2018), p. 1, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. Collective security is a strength of the liberal perspective on world politics. A still more convincing example of the limits of institutional binding might be cases in which binding would have solved a problem but was judged insufficiently effective.

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